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JULY-AUGUST, 1962
URBAN DRAINAGE: ASPECTS OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LIABILITY
By WILLIAM E. KENWORTHY*
As April showers bring May flowers, it seems to be equally
true that July thunderstorms bring August litigation concerning
drainage. The-greater portion of this litigation arises in cities where
open ground, which once edgerly absorbed rain, has been replaced
by roads, sidewalks and rooftops. Drains have been constructed and
maintained -with varying degrees of foresight and care. Improve-
ments have been made which change the natural grade of the land.
The phenomenon of the large-scale residential subdivision has added
problems of new dimension and scope. Not only is the storm run-off
increased in volume from the waterproofed urban landscape, but
also the critical storm flow is concentrated into a shorter time.
Nevertheless, the problems incident to municipal drainage are
by no means new. The will of Benjamin Franklin reflected his
concern for the water supply and drainage situation in Philadelphia.
Since that time a formidable, sometimes confusing, body of law has
been developed on the various aspects of this subject. It is the aim
of this article to present some of the basic doctrines and trends
relating to both public and private liability for the interference with.
drainage within the confines of a municipality.
At the outset, it is advisable to review the basic rules relating
to the drainage of surface waters which have been applied in the
United States. Traditional analysis divides the nation into two
camps: the common law or "common enemy" states and the civil
law states. In reality there now seem to be four distinct apo)roaches
to the subject, with numerous variants upon each. Under the com-
mon law doctrine, surface waters are regarded as a "common ene-
my." Every property owner has the right to take steps to expel
such waters from his own land by any appropriate means without
liability for casting the water upon another's land. Under the civil
law rule of "natural servitudes," lower lands are servient to the
natural surface drainage from all lands above. However, the servi-
tude exists only for natural drainage; an upper proprietor may not
do anything to alter the natural drainage conditions in any way
under the strict civil law rule.'
A third group of states have now adopted a modified version
of either rule. Generally, it seems to make little difference whether
the modification takes as its base the common enemy or the civil
law rule. In either event a landowner is normally entitled to make
reasonable changes in his land to alter or accelerate the natural
drainage, so long as water is not collected and cast in a body upon
the land of a neighbor. A fourth rule, based upon "reasonable user,"
* An associate of the Denver firm of Fugote, Mitchem, McGinley & Hoffman.
I 6-A American Law of Property § 28.63 (Casner ed. 1954).
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reaches essentially the same result, while specifically rejecting both
the common enemy and the civil law rules.
2
The Restatement of Torts, section 833, takes the broad position
that liability for interference with the flow of surface waters rests
upon the same basis as liability for an invasion of property by vi-
brations, noise, smoke or pollution: "Where the invasion is not
intentional, the liability . . . depends upon whether his conduct
has been negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous .... Where, however,
the invasion is intentional, liability depends upon whether the in-
vasion is unreasonable." In viewing this broad basis, it should be
borne in mind that invasion by water is not strictly analogous to
invasion by the other forces mentioned above, all of which are
created by the activity of man. However, the application of the
rules stated would lead, in. most instances, to the same result as
the "modified doctrine" now applied in many states.
It may be noted in passing that there are circumstances from
which an easement or irrevocable license for drainage may be
created. Hence, the possible application of basic real property doc-
trines should not be overlooked.
3
Two variables are common to almost every drainage case. The
first is the original position of the parties on the surface of the land.
Did waters originally drain from A toward B or vice versa? The
second variable relates to the action of which complaint is made.
The action may be preventive, by repelling water which would
otherwise drain onto the land, or positive, which would consist of
steps taken to increase the speed or quantity of drainage from the
land. Neither of these variables per se changes the result under the
common enemy doctrine. Either the upper or the lower proprietor
may improve his lot, and it makes no difference whether the water
is cast off or simply repelled.
4
I. PRIVATE LIABILITY
A. The Common Enemy Doctrine
The first known application of the common enemy doctrine in
the United States is Gannon v. Hargadon5 in 1865. In 1881 the com-
2 An excellent review of general law pertinent to the subject of surface drainage can be found
in an annotation at 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958). The following list compiled from the annotation and
other sources may be found useful for quick reference. There is some overlapping in the lists due
to the application of different rules to urban and rural property.
Common Enemy States Civil Low States Civil Law States Modified Doctrine
Arkansas Alabama (Continued) (Continued)
Connecticut Arizona Tennessee No. Dakota
Dist. of Columbia California Texas Ohio
Hawaii Georgia Vermont Oklahoma
Indiana Idaho Oreqon
Iowa Illinois Modified Doctrine Virgina
Maine Iowa Pennsylvania
Massachusetts Kansas Alabama So. Dakota
Missouri Kentucky Arkansas
Montana Louisiana Florida Reasonable User
New York Michigan Iowa
North Dakota New Mexico Colorado Minnesota
So. Carolina No. Carolina Maryland
Washington Ohio Mississippi New Hampshire
Wisconsin So. Dakota Nebraska New Jersey
It appears significant to note that, unlike the clear-cut distinction between riparian and appropria-
tion doctrine states with respect to the use of water, there is little pattern along geographical or
climatological lines in the states differing as to the drainage of water.
3 See, e.g., Messinger v. Township of Washington, 185 Po.Super. 554, 137 A.2d 890 (1958), an
irrevocable license for a drain.
4 United States v. Shapiro, 202 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Kossoff v. Rathgeb-Walsh, Inc., 3
N.Y.2d 583, 170 N.Y.S.2d 789, 148 N.E.2d 132 (1958).
5 10 Allen (Mass.) 106 (1865).
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mon enemy doctrine was applied to urban drainage problems in
the state of New York.6 The plaintiff brought an action against a
neighbor who had filled his own lot, thereby preventing the his-
toric drainage from a small pond in the street in front of the plain-
tiff's lot. Adopting the dictum of an earlier case, it was held that
surface waters could be repelled at will without liability. The deci-
sion was limited, however, to those improvements made in good
faith.
New Jersey initially followed the common enemy ,doctrine.
Some of the most interesting applications of that doctrine to urban
conditions arose there.7 In one instance litigation arose over rain
water even before it reached the ground. Adjoining property owners
each constructed a garage about one tenth of one foot from the
division line and directly opposite the other's garage. The plaintiff
complained that water from the defendant's higher roof poured
against his garage, causing a wet wall. It was held that no relief
could be granted since the common enemy doctrine applied. 8
The common enemy doctrine was also applied in New Jersey
to favor the development of land for residential subdivisions. A
most exhaustive discussion of this aspect, as well as drainage law
generally throughout the country, can be found in Yonadi v. Home-
stead Country Homes, Inc.9 Action there was brought by a lower
proprietor against the developer of a higher forty-acre tract, which
previously had been farm land. The defendant had installed drains
and had increased the run-off by the change to residential uses. It
was found that at least thirty of the forty acres still drained to the
same area or point as originally, but there was some doubt as to
whether the grading had changed the drainage pattern for the re-
maining ten acres. It was pointed out that, in general, one who
improves or alters land is not subject to liability for affecting the
flow of surface waters. However, an exception exists that imposes
absolute liability for transmitting water, by means of artificial de-
vices such as drains or ditches, in a body large enough to do sub-
stantial injury and casting it upon lands where it otherwise would
not have flowed. The trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was
6 Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 40 Am.Rep. 519 (1881).
7 In Hopler v. Morris Hills Regional Dist., '45 N.J.Super. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1957), a "reasonable use" rule was adopted. See text, section E. Reasonable Use Rule.
8 McCullough v. Hartpence, 141 N.J.Eq. 499, 58 A.2d 233 (Ch. 1948).
9 35 N.J.Super. 514, 114 A.2d 564 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955). See also Granger v. Elm Tree
Village, 23 N.J.Super. 592, 93 A.2d 641 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1952).
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remanded with directions to determine whether this exception
applied to the ten acres. 10
Application of the common enemy doctrine to subdivision de-
velopments was summarized in Wallace v. Schneider," a Kentucky
case: "The owner of the dominant estate may drain and ditch his
land for the purpose of ridding it of surface water .. .building
sewers, gutters and culverts without liability . . . so long as he
does not tap additional territory from which surface waters other-
wise would not have flowed.
12
B. The Civil Law Doctrine
The strict civil law approach, prohibiting both upper and lower
proprietors from altering natural drainage conditions has seemingly
found little application to purely urban conditions. However, some
modern cases apply the doctrine to city property. 3 In one instance
it was invoked as a basis for municipal liability arising from a de-
fective storm sewer.
14
The process of urbanization necessarily changes the drainage
regimen; natural drainage conditions no longer exist. Hence, the
application of strict civil law doctrines to land within cities tends
to be unrealistic. Furthermore, such a rule has a tendency to inhibit
growth and development. Property owners may be discouraged
from bringing their land to grade. As will be shown subsequently,
these considerations have led some states to adopt a distinction
between rural and urban property in their drainage law. In other
states the civil law rule has been modified in order to free urban
development from its liabilities. 15
C. Modified Common Law Rule
In those states modifying the common law rule, it has been
stated in effect that one may repel surface water subject to the
limitation that he must not act wantonly or unnecessarily. This
means that improvements must be made in good faith with such
care as not to injure needlessly the adjoining property. 16 A further
qualification has been expressed that one cannot collect water in
an artificial channel and cast it upon his neighbor's land.1 7 Another
stated exception is that the landowner must not act negligently in
shutting out the flow of surface water.'8 Normally the action af-
fecting drainage is incident to some other program of improve-
ment.19 However, the improvement of drainage conditions alone
should suffice to justify action.
10 An application of the same exception is West Orange v. Field, 37 N.J.Eq. 600, 45 Am.Re,
670 (Ct. Err. & App. 1882). It should also be noted that the common enemy doctrine does not Opp
to collections of ice or snow, Brownsey v. General Printing Ink Corp., 118 N.J.L. 505, 193 AtI.
824 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
11310 Ky. 17, 219 S.W.2d 977 (1949).
12 Id. at 22, 219 S.W.2d at 980.
13 See, e.g., Rinzler v. Folsom, 209 Go. 549, 74 S.E.2d 661 (1953); Hancock v. Stull, 199 Md.
434, 86 A.2d 734 (1952); Olson v. Westerberg, 2 III.App.2d 285, 119 N.E.2d 413 (1954). The latter
case, although applying the civil low approach, speaks of trespass by successive invasions of
water and silt.
14 Cannon v. City of Macon, 81 Go.App. 310, 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950).
15 6-A American Law of Property 1 28.63 (Casner ed. 1954).
16 Mason v. Lamb, 189 Va. 348, 53 S.E.2d 7 (1949).
17 Hodges Manor Corp. v. Mayflower Park Corp., 197 Va. 344, 89 S.E.2d 59 (1955).
18 Taylor v. Harrison Constr. Co., 178 Pa.Super. 544, 115 A.2d 757 (1955).
19 Roth v. Great A & P Tea Co., 108 F.Supp. 390 (E.D. N.Y. 1952); Nassau County v. Cherry




D. Modified Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule has been modified in some instances to per-
mit the alteration of natural drainage conditions by an upper pro-
prietor, provided the water is not sent down in a manner or quan-
tity to do more harm than formerly. This has been expressed as
the civil law rule, "modified to meet the exigencies and circum-
stances of each particular case. '20 Again, questions of due care be-
come involved.
21
There is some support for a rule that where two methods of
disposing of water are available, each equally efficacious, and
neither requiring unreasonable expense, the one which will not
damage adjoining property must be chosen. For instance, in Holman
v. Richardson," a lower proprietor had to dig a drainage ditch rather
than build a brick wall, the cost of either being equal.
An interesting application of the civil law approach occurred
in Maryland. The defendant's predecessor had installed a tile drain
in place of a ditch across the premises and had built over the drain.
Because a very unhealthy condition was eventually created by lack
of maintenance, the defendant blocked the drain. The plaintiff, an
upper proprietor, sought an injunction. It was decreed that the
defendant need not reopen the drain unless the plaintiff put it in
repair and maintained it.
23
E. Reasonable Use Rule
After years of adherence to the common enemy doctrine, New
Jersey recently abandoned it in favor of the "reasonable use" rule.'
4
Minnesota and New Hampshire also follow it. Reasonablesness be-
comes a question of fact, allowing consideration of all pertinent
factors. As stated by the New Hampshire court: "In determining
the question of reasonableness, the effect of the use upon the in-
terests of both parties, the benefits derived from it by one, the in-
jury caused by it to the other, and all the circumstances affecting
either of them, are to be considered."' 5
F. The Urban-Rural Distinction
As a general rule, most states recognize a distinction between
rural and urban conditions in the application of drainage law. 26
However, the results are not uniform among the states making this
distinction. In a limited number of civil law states it mdkes no dif-
ference whether the controversy arises in a city or in the country.27
20 Boulder v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co., 73 Colo. 426, 430, 216 Pac. 553, 555
(1923); accord, Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Colo. 274, 1 P.2d 581 (1931).
21 Drainage Dist. v. Auckland, 83 Colo. 510, 267 Pac. 605 (1928).
22 115 Miss. 169, 76 So. 136 (1917); accord, Cowan v. Baker, 227 Miss. 828, 87 So.2d 74 (1956).
23 Whitman v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 31 A.2d 630 (1943).
24 Hopler v. Morris Hills Regional Dist., 45 N.J. Super. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1957).
25 Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N.H. 186, 191, 51 AtI. 911, 913 (1901). See also Enderson v. Kelehan,
226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
26 There seems to be little definition of the demarcation between rural and urban areas. It has
been held that land in an incorporated village is urban, in spite of the total absence of sewer
improvements. Keiser v. Mann, 102 Ohio App. 324, 143 N.E.2d 146 (1956). The case first recognizing
the distinction in Ohio was Lunsford v. Steward, 95 Ohio App. 383, 129 N.E.2d 136 (1953), which
added the qualification that the improvements made in an urban area must be made in a "reason-
able manner." It Las also been held that a subdivision with four lots per acre, without drains,
gutters, or sewers, .vould be regarded as urban. Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Constr. Co., 381 Pa. 317,
113 A.2d 148 (1955).
27 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 78 (1947); Johnson v. Morcum, 152 Ky. 629, 153 S.W. 959 (1913); Car-
land v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S.W. 940 (1899). In the latter case it was expressly stated, "We
are unable to see any difference in principle between the reciprocal rights and duties of adjacent
urban proprietors and adjacent rural proprietors."
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In some instances the distinction has applied in reverse, with
a more strict rule concerning the drainage of surface water being
applied to urban property. Thus, in Ginter v. Rector of St. Mark's
Church28 the court stated:
It does not follow that because in the country an upper pro-
prietor may be permitted to aid the surface water on his
field in its exit through a natural channel upon a lower
proprietor ... the same thing can be done in a city in thick-
ly settled portions, where improvements are general, and
a common drainage system has been provided.
29
28 95 Minn. 14, 103 N.W. 738 (1905).












The reasoning in that case seems to assume that the city is obligated
to provide a common drainage system. As will be noted subse-
quently, this assumption is fallacious. At one time in Pennsylvania
it was intimated that the owner of an urban lot was obligated to con-
vey his surface water to a public drain. This dictum was subse-
quently overruled.30
Apparently the first case strongly recognizing the distinction
between urban and rural properties arose in Iowa, a civil law state.3 1
Arkansas subsequently adopted a rule strongly favoring urban
development.3 2 Strangely, the cases most strongly expressing the
rural-urban distinction are from predominantly agricultural states.
In Kansas an unusual situation arose because of a statute abo-
lishing the common enemy rule concerning surface waters. The
plaintiff in Liston v. Scott 33 had maintained a retaining wall at the
rear of his premises to ward off water. The defendant constructed
a higher retaining wall and filled his lot, causing water from a roof
to drain onto the plaintiff's land. An order sustaining the defend-
ant's demurrer was affirmed. The court held that the statute abo-
lishing the common enemy rule applied only to rural areas.
Even though more liberal rules apply to urban property, it
appears to be universally stated that an upper proprietor cannot
accumulate or concentrate water into artificial channels and dis-
charge it upon his neighbor.34 Furthermore, at least in California, a
special rule applies to waters in those intermittent watercourses
which handle storm waters after heavy rains. Such waters are not
surface waters; nor are they in a natural watercourse. One cannot
lawfully cast such waters upon the land of another to his damage.
In making provisions for such waters, however, a municipality
will not be liable if acting reasonably upon the basis of past ex-
perience.
35
Alabama has a long line of cases dealing with the distinction
between urban and rural areas. These cases illustrate the difficulty
which has been experienced in finding the proper rule for the
development of urban areas. Initially, the court boldly held that
urban property may be improved without liability.36 At that time
Alabama was declared to generally follow the civil law rule. This
initial urban case was modified by subsequent decisions holding
that an upper proprietor cannot alter the natural drainage so as to
increase the total area to which the lower is servient.3 7 It was also
implied that the development of a lot by a lower proprietor, so as
to impede drainage, must be reasonable and natural. 3 Subsequently,
it was determined that "the only basis for liability in such cases
is to be found in a wrongful or negligent exercise of the right" to
30 Reilly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252, 70 Al. 1097 (1908). Compare Chamberline v. Ciaffoni,
373 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140 (1953).
31 Phillips v. Waterhouse, 60 Iowa 199, 28 N.W. 539 (1886).
32 Timmons v. Clayton, 222 Ark. 327, 259 S.W.2d 501 (1953); Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41, 112
S.W. 173 (1908).
33 108 Kan. 180, 194 Pac. 642 (1921).
34 Jaxon v. Clapp, 45 CaI.App. 214, 187 Pac. 69 (Dist. Ct. App. 1919); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 116 (c)
(1956).
35 Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 Pac. 375 (1894); Weck
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 104 Cal.App.2d 599, 232 P.2d 293 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
36 Hall v. Rising, 141 Ala. 433, 37 So. 586 (1904). In this case the lower proprietor impeded
drainage by filling his lot.
37 Perry v. McCrow, 226 Ala. 400, 147 So. 178 (1933); Southern Ry. v. Lewis, 165 Ala. 555, 51
So. 746 (1910).
38 Shahan v. Brown, 179 Aia. 425, 60 So. 891 (1913).
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impede drainage.39 Finally, two recent companion cases demon-
strated that a different policy applies to upper proprietors as con-
trasted to lower proprietors in urban areas.40 The defendant had.
developed a subdivision which included a system of drains alleged
to cast water upon the plaintiffs, who were owners of lower ground.
The right of lo Wier proprietors in urban areas to obstruct drainage
was reaffirmed. However, the court said that the liability of an
upper proprietor for collecting surface waters and casting them
upon the lower is not affected by whether the area is within an
incorporated town or city. The degree of care exercised by the
developer is immaterial. Liability exists for concentrating surface
water and casting it upon a lower owner to his damage, when, if
it were not so collected, it would be scattered and diffused. In
Alabama then, the civil law doctrine appears to apply without
exception to upper proprietors.
41
In passing from the subject of the rural-urban distinction, it
must be noted that basic principles of torts may create liabilities
superimposed upon specific drainage law.
42
G. Application of Rules to Residential Subdivisions
Problems incident to the development of large-scale residential
subdivisions require special consideration. Since these developments
take place in previously rural areas, the vital question is whether
one can, by changing the use of his land, alter legal duties to his
neighbor. Apparently, the issue has been faced squarely in only
one case, Rau v. Wilden Acres, Inc.43 In the course of subdividing
his land, the defendant constructed a drainage ditch in a swale
leading onto the plaintiff's land. Both tracts were formerly rural
property, and the court indicated that the matter should be treated
accordingly. This ruling was unnecessary to the case, for the court
applied the generally applicable rule that one may not collect
waters in an artificial channel and cast them upon another's prop-
erty. As noted, this holds true in either rural or urban areas.44
Accordingly, an injunction was granted. In contrast, a subsequent
case from the same jurisdiction intimated that the rules governing
urban areas should be applied initially to subdivision developers.45
The issue remains in doubt.
Two recent cases having virtually identical facts, with opposing
results, highlight the different approaches to the problems posed
by subdivisions. In both cases the developer had installed a system
of storm drains which discharged into a natural watercourse travers-
ing the plaintiff's property. The increased flow in both instances
resulted in erosion of land along the stream. New Jersey, applying
its reasonable use rule, required the defendant to pipe the entire
stream to an outlet on a lake. 46 In so doing, the court commented:
39 Ex porte Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 206 Ala. 403, 90 So. 876 (1921).
40 Kay-Noo in Dev. Co. v. Kinzer, 259 Ala. 49, 65 So.2d 510 (1953); Kay-Nooiin Dev. Co. v.
Hockett, 253 A a. 588, 45 So.2d 792 (1950).
41 Vinson v. Turner, 252 Ala. 271, 40 So.2d 863 (1949).
42 See, for example, the annotation concernina overflow or escape of water from excavation
mode in the course of construction, 23 A.L.R.2d 827 (1952).
43376 Pa. 493, 103 A.2d 422 (1954).
44 Since such subdivisions normally contain some system of drains, this rule may find frequent
application. For a similar case see Hodges Manor Corp. v. Mayflower Park Corp., 197 Va. 344,
89 S.E.2d 59 (1955). Here the "artificial channel" rule was recognized as an exception to Virginia's
modified common enemy approach.
45 Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Constr. Co., 381 Pa. 317, 113 A.2d 148 (1955).
46 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
DICTA
JULY-AUGUST, 1962
"The issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness becomes a ques-
tion of fact to be determined in each. case upon a consideration of
all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount
of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm which results, the
purpose or motive with which the possessor acted, and all other
relevant matter. ' 47 The New Jersey court also took the position
that the economic burden of the expulsion of surface waters from
areas being developed for urban use should be borne by those
who are in the business for profit rather than by adjoining land-
owners.
The same facts appeared in Colorado, 48 which follows a modi-
fied civil law doctrine. The defendant was not charged with negli-
gence. The basis for the appellate decision, which affirmed the
judgment for the defendant, was that a natural watercourse may
be used as a conduit for the drainage of lands, at least where the
augmented flow will not tax the stream beyond its capacity and
cause the flooding of lower lands. By implication, acceleration of
erosion does not constitute taxing a stream beyond its capacity.
II. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
The second major aspect of urban drainage law involves the
bases of liability against municipal corporations for faulty drain-
age.49 The importance of this topic is indicated by the fact that in
every modern community throughout the world the storm drainage
problem is regarded and undertaken as a municipal function.50
The potential theories of liability advanced against municipal
corporations are numerous: negligent planning or construction;
negligent maintenance; nonfeasance by failure to correct known
inadequacies; positive interference with natural drainage, including
obstruction by roads; eminent domain; nuisance and other absolute
liabilities. Each of these bases receives separate consideration here-
after.
A. Negligent Planning or Construction
As a general proposition, municipal corporations are not liable
for mere failure to provide drainage systems. Nor are they liable
for negligence in the initial planning of storm water disposal.51 The
establishment of a drainage system is a discretionary exercise of
legislative power, with which the courts cannot interfere.52 If a
party has constructed improvements below a legally established
grade, a city is almost certainly not bound to protect him.53
On the other hand, a city may be held liable for negligence in
the course of construction, as distinguished from design. 54 This is a
47 Id. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10.
48 Ambrosio v. PerI-Mack Constr. Co., 143 Colo. 49, 351 P.2d 803 (1960).
49 An excellent general discussion of this aspect may be found in 18 McQuillin, Municipal Cor-
porations §§ 53.117-53.144 (3d ed. 1950).
50 In comparison to sanitary sewers, storm drains are expensive because of their large capacity.
Los Angeles County, after spending $179,000,000 on storm drains to relieve local flooding, needs
additional storm drains costing about a billion dollars to provide adequate relief from local floods
and to protect areas as yet undeveloped. Engineering News-Record, March 13. 1958, p. 28.
51 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations J 53.121 (3d ed. 1950); City of Englewood v. Linkenheil,
362 P.2d 186 (Colo. 1961); Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554, 13 Pac. 729 (1887); Daniels v. City of
Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875); Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134 (1952).
52 Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134 (1952).
53 Denver v. Stanley Aviation, 143 Colo. 182, 352 P.2d 291 (1960); Aicher v. City of Denver, 10
Colo.App. 413, 52 Pac. 86 (1897).
54 Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554, 13 Pac. 729 (1887); Gibson v. State, 187 Misc. 931, 64 N.Y.S.2d
632 (Ct. CI. 1946). The former case held the city liable where earth thrown up temporarily in the




purely proprietary action which does not call for the exercise of
governmental discretion. It appears that this rule has been applied
to hold a city liable for faults in design, calling the defect one of
"construction. '55 The distinction requires close observance.
There are two principal exceptions to the statement that a city
is not liable for failure to provide drainage or for negligence in
planning. If, as a result of the city's affirmative acts, additional
waters are cast upon the plaintiff's land, then there is liability for
negligent adoption of a plan. Also, if the city abandons a drain, it
will be liable where property is thereby left in a worse position
than it was before construction of a drain.56 The liability for posi-
tive misfeasance applies not only to drainage of surface waters but
also to alterations in surface watercourses. If the municipality
should know that its actions will result in increased erosion, action
must be taken reasonably calculated to avoid that result.
5 7
B. Negligent Maintenance and Failure to Correct Inadequacies
On the other hand, it is generally acknowledged that a city is
liable for negligence in maintenance of existing sewers.58 However,
in Georgia, maintenance of sewers has been held to be a govern-
mental function for which there is no liability based on negligence.59
One vital question which arises here is whether a city may be liable
for continuing to maintain a storm sewer, with actual knowledge
of its inadequacy. As noted above, the city is not liable for planning
an inadequate system. But liability may be predicated upon failure
to correct that inadequacy after it has been demonstrated by ex-
perience. 0
The next question which naturally arises in this connection is
whether a city must have a program of inspection and preventive
maintenance. Logically, the issue would resolve into whether a
reasonable man, in the exercise of due care, would inspect. Beyond
55 City of Ashland v. Kittle, 305 S.W.2d 768 Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
56 Cattin v. Omaha, 149 Neb. 434, 31 N.W.2d 300 (1943); Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244
P.2d 134 (1952); Gibson v. State, 187 Misc. 931, 64 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
57 Kidde Mfg. Co. v. Bloomfield, 20 N.J. 52, 118 A.2d 535 (1955).
58 Malvernia Inv.' Co. v. Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951); Denver v. Copelli, 4 Colo.
29 (1877); True v. Mayor of Westernport, 196 Md. 280, 76 A.2d 135 (1950); City of Meridian v.
Sullivan, 209 Miss. 61, 45 So.2d 851 (1950); Sigurdson v. Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 155, 292 P.2d 214
(1956); McCabe v. City of Parkersburg, 138 W.Va. 830, 79 S.E.2d 87 (1953).
59 Foster v. Savannah, 77 Ga.App. 346, 48 S.E.2d 686 (1948).
60 Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931); Cannon v. City of Macon, 81 Ga.App.
310, 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950). Contra, Bratonjo v. Milwaukee, 3 Wis.2d 120, 87 N.W.2d 775 (1958),
holding that mere inadequacy, na-matter how obvious it becomes, can never be the basis for
liability. See annot., 70 A.L.R. 1347 (1931), "Liability of municipality where sewer originally of
ample size has become inadequate by growth or development of territory."
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that it must be determined what constitutes a reasonable inspection
and preventive maintenance program. These issues seem to be fac-
tual in nature. Nevertheless, most of the decisions on this question
indicate that the city must have an inspection and periodic main-
tenance program.B1 The city must take notice of such conditions as
ordinary care will discover. As expressed in one case, the city is
bound to take notice of the susceptibility of timbers or other ma-
terials to deteriorate from time and use.
62
Does the occurrence of sewer stoppage raise a presumption that
the city has failed in its duty of inspection and maintenance? In
one instance it was held that there must be proof of the nature of
the obstruction, in order to show that it was something which
should have been anticipated or which periodic inspection would
have disclosed.63 On the other hand, such circumstances have been
viewed as proper for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
64
Some states have statutes prohibiting civil actions against a
city arising because of defective conditions unless written notice
of the condition is given to the authorities before the damage occurs.
Such a statute was avoided in interesting fashion.in one New York
case.65 It was alleged that the city controlled the drains and that,
by reason of negligence in maintenance, overflow upon the plain-
tiff's property had been caused. The court observed that prior notice
is not required where the alleged negligence is active in nature. It
was then observed that the city had undertaken to provide drains,
and, having done so, negligence in the performance of duties of
maintenance rendered the city liable without notice.
Ever since Rylands v. Fletcher,66 the law has viewed with a
jaundiced eye any party who impounds large quantities of water.
Thus, in the course of protecting the city from surface water, if a
large quantity is impounded, negligence at any stage will furnish
a basis for liability.6 7
C. Positive Interference with Natural Drainage
Where a city takes action which interferes in a positive manner
with natural drainage conditions, it will be liable for damage there-
by resulting to private property.68 A special instance of this liability
may occur when a city illegally and improperly establishes or
changes a high street grade so as to obstruct drainage.69 Normally,
the establishment of a street grade requires approval by ordinance.
In Brown v. Sigourney,70 an action was brought for damages caused
when the city raised the level of the street, resulting in an accumu-
lation of water on plaintiff's land. In affirming judgment for the
plaintiff, the court said:
So far as the record shows there is no established grade for
61 Yearsley v. City of Pocatello, 69 Idaho 500, 210 P.2d 795 (1949); City of Meridian v. Bryant,
232 Miss. 892, 100 So.2d 860 (1958); Scamp v. State, 189 Misc. 802, 70 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
62 Dunn v. Boise City, 48 Idaho 538, 283 Pac. 609 (1929).
63 Lobster Pot v. City of Lowell, 333 Mass. 31, 127 N.E.2d 659 (1955).
64 Anello v. Kansas City, 286 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
65 Randle v. City of Rome, 195 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Oneida County Ct. 1960).
66 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
67 Hogan v. Hot Springs, 58 N.M. 220, 269 P.2d 1102 (1954).
68 Andrew Jergens Co. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal.App.2d 232, 229 P.2d 475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951),
in which water from a 500 acre area would be funneled onto the plaintiff's land.
69 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1227 (1950).
70 164 Iowa 184, 145 N.W. 478 (1914).
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the streets of the city of Sigourney. Such [can be done]
only by means of an ordinance. . . .When the grade is so
established, streets may be changed in their height to con-
form to it without creating liability for resulting damages.
But until a grade is so established a city may not make
changes in the surface of the street resulting in damages
to adjacent property owners without being liable for the
same.
71
A number of other cases support this position.
72
McQuillin takes the view that a city should not be liable for
the unauthorized acts of its agents if the city would not be liable
if acting properly.73 Nevertheless, an adjacent property owner can-
not rely upon an illegally established grade in improving his prop-
erty.74 The alteration of a street level is not some casual caprice of
a minor official of which the responsible parties may claim igno-
rance. It would therefore seem just to impose liability upon the city
for the obstruction which its agents have erected.
If a grade is properly established, then there can be no liability
for mere obstruction of surface drainage.75 But if it can be shown
that the road constitutes a trap or funnel, collecting and discharg-
ing water on private property, liability again may be predicated
upon the positive action of the municipality. 76 Furthermore, it is
incumbent upon a municipality, in crossing a natural watercourse




Still another potential basis for liability is found in the recovery
of consequential damages in eminent domain proceedings. It is
recognized as a general rule that "where land is flooded, or its
drainage prevented, by the obstruction of the flow of water, or its
diversion from its natural channel, there is, in general, such a taking
or injury as entitles the owner to compensation, although the im-
provement causing the injury was authorized by the legislature."75
Obstruction of drainage occasionally results from new highway or
street construction. The resulting injury to private property is an
item which is to be considered in proceedings in eminent domain. 7i
In Board of County Comm'rs v. Adler,80 the county had caused the
flooding of plaintiff's lands when, in constructing a bridge across
the Platte River, it had filled up certain of its channels. This caused
a backwater effect in time of flood which inundated the land in
question. Recovery for this damage was allowed even though the
71 Id. at 186, 145 NW. at 479.
72 Gonzalez v. Pensacola, 65 Fla. 241, 61 So. 503 (1913); Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90, 10 Am.Rep.
12 (1871); Blandon v. Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 441, 71 N.W. 411 (1913); Richardson v. Webster City,
Ill Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900); Trustees of P.E. Church v. Anamosa, 76 Iowa 538, 41 N.W. 313
(1889); Radcliffe v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 195, 53 Am.Dec. 357 (1850); Smith v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 514
(1831); Meinzer v. City of Racine, 74 Wis. 166, 42 N.W. 230 (1889); Crossett v. Janesville, 28 Wis.
420 (1871).
73 13 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 592 (3d ed. 1950).
74 Leadville v. McDonald, 67 Colo. 131, 186 Pac. 715 (1919).
75 Scamp v. State, 189 Misc. 802, 70 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Lynch v. Mayor, 76 N.Y. 60,
32 Am.Rep. 271 (1879).
76 Sheehan v. Richmond County, 100 Ga.App. 496, 111 S.E.2d 924 (1959); Lynch v. Mayor, 76
N.Y. 60, 32 Am.Rep. 271 (1879).
77 Board of County Comm'rs v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920); Powelson v. Seattle,
87 Wash. 617, 152 Pac. 329 (1915).
78 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain 1 117 (1941).
79 Board of Comm'rs v. Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 184 P.2d 142 (1947); Bockover v. Board of Super-
visors, 13 S.D. 317, 83 N.W. 335 (1900).
80 Supra note 77.
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plaintiff's land did not abut upon the improvement. A slightly dif-
ferent question is presented when a municipal collection system
for storm waters tends to discharge water in a location where it
floods private property. There appears to be a division of authority
as to whether this action constitutes an injuring of private property
for public use.8'
E. Nuisance and Other Absolute Liabilities
Theories of nuisance have been applied as a basis for municipal
liability in appropriate instances, thereby avoiding the necessity
for proof of negligence. Where a city has created a condition which
results in the flooding of private property after each heavy rain,
only a temporary nuisance exists. Consequently, each subsequent
flooding creates a new cause of action, largely due to the impossi-
bility of estimating damage to be suffered in the future.82 In some
cases it has been shown that, due to a defect in the system, storm
waters were able to percolate into sanitary sewers. The natural
consequence is an overtaxing of the sanitary sewer and the flooding
of private homes with filth. After repeated occasions, this consti-
tutes a nuisance in every sense of the term.8 3 Of course, the condi-
tion must have persisted for a period of time sufficient to dem-
onstrate that it is a recurrent interference with the enjoyment of
property.
A sewer system, once adequate, tends to become inadequate
and insufficient as a result of continued growth of the community.
Where this results in repeated instances of damage to private prop-
erty, the city will be liable if, after notice of the nuisance, it fails
to adopt and execute measures necessary to correct the condition.84
81 City of Englewood v. Linkenheil, 362 P.2d 186 (Colo. 1961); City of Jackson v. Cook, 214
Miss. 201, 58 So.2d 498 (1952).
82 City of Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 245 P.2d 255 (1952); City of Tucson v. O'Reilly
Motor Co., 64 Ariz. 240, 168 P.2d 245 (1946) (obstruction of natural watercourse by inadequate
culvert).
83 Pettinger v. Village of Winnebago, 239 Minn. 156, 58 N.W.2d 325 (1953); Clark v. City of
Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
84 City of Ado v. Conoy, 198 Okla. 206, 177 P.2d 89 (1947).
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Therefore, although a city is not liable for any initial failure to
adopt an adequate drainage plan, liability will result for continued
maintenance of a system which constitutes a private nuisance.85
Municipal liability also exists, independent of negligence, where
water is artificially impounded or collected and then discharged
upon private property.8 6 Although the cases in such instances oc-
casionally speak in terms of nuisance, it is unnecessary to show
recurrent injury with notice to the municipality.8 Even though
the liability is absolute, equity will not be required to grant an in-
junction where no substantial injury to the private property is
shown and great public detriment would result from discontinuance
of the sewer facilities.88
Since flooding as a result of the failure of municipal dams or
dikes occurs typically after unusually heavy rains, it is natural to
expect an "Act of God" to be alleged as a defense. In this respect,
the duty is thrust upon a city to anticipate such rainfalls as experi-
ence shows do occur occasionally, although at infrequent intervals.89
III. CONCLUSION
It must be remembered that the growth of urban civilization
results in a radical alteration of the natural drainage regimen. A
well-planned municipal drainage system is a necessity. Otherwise
a chaotic situation results, with each individual property owner
seeking- to protect his property as best he can. Yet, the courts have
recognized that in the process of planning and executing a drainage
system there exists an area of legislative discretion with which
they cannot interfere. A most interesting approach to the resulting
plight of the property owner has been adopted by a South Carolina
statute which is believed to be unique: "Whenever . . .it shall be
necessary or desirable to carry off the surface water from any
street, alley, or other public thoroughfare along such thoroughfare
rather than over private lands adjacent to or adjoining such thor-
oughfare, such municipality shall, upon demand from the owner
of such private lands, provide sufficient drainage...." 90 This statute
has been interpreted to require some positive act by the municipa-
lity which alters the natural drainage pattern before the property
owner has a right to demand that drainage be provided.9' Thus, a
city is not liable to provide drainage if it merely annexes an area
in which roads are already constructed. 92 Nevertheless, this statute
appears to present a step in the right direction. The continuing
process of urbanization will render municipal drainage problems
increasingly important. It would appear to be time for the relative
rights and responsibilities of cities and property owners to be set
forth in systematic fashion.
85 Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Poc. 788 (1931).
86Willson v. Boise City, 20 Idaho 133, 117 Poc. 115 (1911); Woods v. State Centre, 249 Iowa
38, 85 N.W.2d 519 (1957); Wendel & Sons, Inc. v. Newark, 138 N.J.Eq. 69, 46 A.2d 793 (Ch. 1946);
Nolan v. Carr, 189 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. C?. 1959); Dixon v. Nashville, 29 Tern.App. 282, 203 S.W.2d
178 (1946).
87 See, e.g., Dixon v. Nashville, 29 Tenn.App. 282, 203 S.W.2d 178 (1946).
88 Nolan v. Carr, 189 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
89 Willson v. Boise City, 20 Idaho 133, 117 Pac. 115 (1911).
90 S.C. Code § 59-224 (Supp. 1960).
91 Belue v. Greenville, 226 S.C. 192, 84 S.E.2d 631 (1954); Holliday v. Greenville, 224 S.C. 207,
78 S.E.2d 279 (1953).
92 Hill v. Greenville, 223 S.C. 392, 76 S.E.2d 294 (1953). Compare Macedonia Baptist Church v.
Columbia, 195 S.C. 59, 10 S.E.2d 350.(1940) where, as a result of several alterations in the drainage
pattern by the city, recovery was upheld.
DICTA
